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FILE No. NE M 2/48 (Part )

TITLE: CEASE FIRE IN MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN  
ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

## REFER TO

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## **USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE**

**LAST FILE:** NONE.

None.

**NEXT FILE:** \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER RELATED FILES: ~~NEH-244, NEH-250, NEH 2/51.~~

(1)

SECRET

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761

TO WASHINGTON  
8 AUGUST 1973. (NED)

NEM 2/52.

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761 OF 8 AUGUST REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO NICOSIA HQBFNE TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS  
UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT.

(35)

(1)

NEM 2/51

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2317 AND CAIRO TELEGRAMS NOS 861 AND 863:

MIDDLE EAST.

WE FULLY RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT  
JEOPARDISE THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. WE  
ARE ANXIOUS TO HELP THE AMERICANS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OVER THE  
U.S., AS INDEED OUR AGREEMENT TO ACCEDE TO THEIR REQUEST OVER  
PRE-POSITIONING THESE AIRCRAFT QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE  
INDICATES. WE ALSO RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THE  
LIKELY REACTION IN WASHINGTON TO A REFUSAL BY US TO MEET THE U.S.  
REQUEST. WE MUST, HOWEVER, KNOW MORE ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE  
SOVIET UNION AND WE MUST CONSIDER CAREFULLY ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR  
AGREEING TO THIS PROPOSAL.

2. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY SPEAK AT ONCE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT  
STRESSING THAT WE WANT TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP. UNLESS THE U.S.  
GOVERNMENT ON RECONSIDERATION FAVOUR TURKEY AS A BASE FOR THESE  
AIRCRAFT, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER  
FAVOURABLY THE PROPOSAL THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, SUBJECT TO OUR RECEIVING SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES  
ON THE FOLLOWING TWO POINTS:

- (i) THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIESCES IN THIS PROPOSAL IN TERMS  
WHICH WE CONSIDER SATISFACTORY:
- (ii) THAT WE ARE SURE THAT THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE THAT  
A BRITISH BASE WILL BE USED FOR THIS OPERATION: THEY WILL CERTAINLY  
BECOME AWARE OF THIS FACT AT SOME STAGE. WE SHOULD MUCH PREFER THAT  
THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS BY H.M. AMBASSADOR  
SPEAKING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

/3.

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For V.B.

PA

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- 2 -

3. AS REGARDS CYPRUS, WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ORIGINAL PREFERENCE WAS FOR A BASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN OUR VIEW, THE USE OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS WOULD POSE THE SAME PROBLEMS AS A BASE IN THE U.K., WITH THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM CURRENT SOVIET INTEREST IN CYPRUS. WE THEREFORE DO NOT THINK THAT YOU NEED PURSUE THE QUESTION OF A CYPRUS BASE WITH THE AMERICANS, AND YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE ANY RENEWED INTEREST THEY MAY EXPRESS IN THE USE OF CYPRUS AS A MAIN BASE.

4. AS REGARDS REFUELING AND RECOVERY FACILITIES IN CYPRUS, WE FORESEE NO SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INFORM THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT OF THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS. IN DOING THIS, WE WOULD WISH TO MENTION THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON THE TWO POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

5. WE PRESUME THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SAYING NOTHING PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE ABOUT THE USE OF U.S. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) COMMENT PUBLICLY ON MATTERS OF THIS KIND. IF HOWEVER THE AMERICANS HAVE A FALL-BACK POSITION FOR USE IF COMMENT CANNOT BE AVOIDED WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT IT IS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS.

6. SEE MY I.F.T.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TELEGRAM NO 404

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

8 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 404 DATED 8 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TELEDAW V JISNE DI4 JIS GULF PARIS MOSCOW BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT.

CAIRO TEL NO 859. JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

RECEIVED  
REGISTRY No. 10  
JULY 1970

NEM 2/48.

THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE CONFIRM THAT THE U.S. LINE IS THAT NO FORMAL AGREEMENT IS NEEDED WITH JORDAN ON THE MODULITIES OF THE CEASE FIRE. IN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION WITH THE JORDANIANS, THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY WOULD CONTINUE TO CONFORM WITH THE EXISTING CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE FEDAYEEN. THEY WILL BE MAKING THIS LATTER POINT AGAIN TODAY.

2. THE JORDANIANS REPLIED THAT FOR THEIR PART, THERE WILL BE NO REINFORCEMENT OF JORDAN ARMY POSITIONS DURING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND THERE WOULD BE NO FIRING BY THE ARMY. AS REGARDS THE FEDAYEEN, THEY INTENDED TO PREVENT ALL FIRING BY THEM FROM JORDAN INTO ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT ALL FEDAYEEN RAIDS ACROSS THE JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS ALSO MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT IRAQI ARTILLERY UNITS STATIONED NEAR IRBID MIGHT BREAK THE CEASE FIRE AND THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING THEM MOVED.

3. THE JORDANIANS TOLD US ON 6 AUGUST THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CEASE-FIRE, THEY INTENDED TO REDEPLOY SOME TROOPS FROM THEIR PRESENT "CONFRONTATION" POSTURE TO ONE MORE SUITED TO AN INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE. THEY SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN FORWARD PATROLLING ALONG THE WHOLE LINE OF THE JORDAN, NOT SIMPLY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE VALLEY AS AT PRESENT. THEY SAID THAT THEY INTENDED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN FIRING WEAPONS FROM THE EAST BANK, BUT THAT SINCE THE FEDAYEEN HAD FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN JORDAN, THE JORDAN ARMY WAS UNLIKELY TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS TRANSITING THEIR LINES FOR OPERATIONS ON THE WEST BANK.

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4. THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN TOLD OF THE JORDANIAN REPLY, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE LINE THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN TAKING PUBLICLY. THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE OF THE EFFECT THAT A DELIBERATE ISRAELI LEAK COULD HAVE ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE FEDAYEEN TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JISNE DI4 AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS

MR. PHILLIPS

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TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 406

10 AUGUST 1970

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11 AUG 1970

REPEATED  
NEM 2/48.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 406 DATED 10 AUGUST 1970 FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, JIS(NE), DI4, JIS GULF, PARIS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO 404: JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

SINCE THE AMERICANS HAVE ACCEPTED THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT THE 1967 CEASE-FIRE REMAINS IN FORCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, THEY HAVE NOT MADE ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN ON THE TERMS OR POLICING OF THE CEASE FIRE CONTAINED IN THEIR PROPOSALS. THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO KEEP THEIR SIDE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS TO AN EXPRESSION OF VIEWS AND HOPES, AND HAVE NOT ASKED FOR OR RECEIVED ANY UNDERTAKINGS FROM THEM. IN PARTICULAR THE U.S. EMBASSY HERE HAS BEEN CAREFUL, ON INSTRUCTIONS, NOT TO SAY THAT THEY HOLD THE JORDANIANS "TECHNICALLY" RESPONSIBLE FOR FEDAYEEN VIOLATIONS (CAIRO TEL NO 859).

2. THE JORDANIAN STATEMENT OF THEIR INTENTIONS AS REGARDS THE FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT POLICY OF TRYING TO PREVENT FIRING FROM THE EAST BANK ACROSS THE RIVER. IF THE CHANGED MILITARY SITUATION MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DEPLOY TROOPS CLOSER TO THE JORDAN THAN PREVIOUSLY, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ENFORCE THIS PROHIBITION MORE

/EFFECTIVELY.

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EFFECTIVELY. BUT THE JORDANIAN ARMY DOES NOT BECAUSE OF THE 10 JULY AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES THEM FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN JORDAN SEEM LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH FEDAYCEN GROUPS ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE RIVER IN ORDER TO OPERATE INSIDE ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY, AND THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO ACCEPT THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE AND MAY INCREASE. THEY HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELI REACTION TO IT WILL NOT BE DISPROPORTIONATE.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE JIS(NE) D14 AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.  
MR. PHILLIPS

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EN CLAIR  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 409

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
15 AUGUST 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 409 DATED 15/8/70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DI4 AND JISNE.

BREACHES OF JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN STATED ON 14 AUGUST THAT THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

13 AUGUST 1300Z TO 1500Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT RAIDED THE AREA OF NORTH SHUNA IN THE NORTH JORDAN VALLEY USING ROCKETS AND CANNON. TARGETS APPEARED TO BE CIVILIAN. JORDANIAN AA ENGAGED FOR TEN MINUTES. NO JORDANIAN CASUALTIES.

14 AUGUST 0910Z TO 1010Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INTERMITTENTLY RAIDED AREA OF AL 'ARAMSHEH BRIDGE AND KHIRBET MARKA'A (SOUTH OF NORTH SHUNA). CIVILIAN VEHICLES WERE ATTACKED WITH CANNONS AND ROCKETS. JORDANIAN AA ENGAGED. 1 CIVILIAN WAS WOUNDED AND ONE CIVILIAN VEHICLE DESTROYED.

14 AUGUST 1230Z TO 1310Z. TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT FORMATIONS (MINIMUM ESTIMATE FOUR AIRCRAFT) RAIDED IRBID TOWN AREA USING CANNON AND ROCKETS. A MILITARY CAMP ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID WAS ATTACKED. 4 SOLDIERS AND 1 CIVILIAN WERE WOUNDED.

14 AUGUST 1300Z TO 1400Z. ISRAELI TANKS AND 155 MM HOWITZERS FIRED FROM THE AREA OF ARAK ASFAH ON THE AREA OF TEL HUNDAKOOK NORTH OF KUREIMA. 1 JORDANIAN WAS KILLED AND 3 WOUNDED. THE JORDANIANS DID NOT REPLY DURING THIS ATTACK BUT DID OPEN FIRE TO GIVE COVER TO PARTIES TRYING TO EVACUATE THEIR CASUALTIES.

/14 AUGUST

-2-

14 AUGUST 1745Z. TWO ISRAELI HELICOPTERS CROSSED THE CEASE FIRE LINE AND FLEW EASTWARDS PASSING SOME SIX KILOMETRES SOUTH OF AMMAN.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

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
16 AUGUST 1970

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4  
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 410 DATED 6 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT BAGHDAD JIS (NE) DI4 AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

M.I.P.T.

BREACHES OF JORDAN-ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.



MY DEFENCE ATTACHE HAS REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:-

ATTACHES RESIDENT IN AMMAN WERE INVITED TO VIEW SCENE OF ATTACK ON MORNING OF 15 AUG. FOUR ATTACHES (BRITISH, IRAQI, SOVIET AND AMERICAN) WERE ESCORTED TO A MILITARY CAMP ABOUT ONE MILE EAST OF IRBID CENTRE. THE CAMP, WHICH LIES WITHIN BARBED WIRE PERIMETER, IS SOME 300 METRES SQUARE. THERE IS A MOSQUE IN THE NORTH EAST CORNER. BUILDINGS ARE SINGLE STOREY REINFORCED CONCRETE AND SOME ROOFS ARE MADE OF CORRIGATED IRON. JORDANIANS STATE THAT EIGHT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ATTACKED BY SECTIONS OF TWO PLANES FROM EAST TO WEST. AT THE TIME ABOUT 10 SOLDIERS WERE IN THE CAMP OF WHOM 8 WERE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED. THE ATTACK, AGAINST THIS CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY TARGET WAS MOST ACCURATE. ANY NEAR MISSES WERE WITHIN 50 METRES OF THE WIRE. THE CAMP IS COMPLETELY DEVASTATED AND MANY BUILDINGS APPEARED DESTROYED BEYOND REPAIR. VERY LARGE CRATERS AT LEAST 12 FOOT DEEP AND 20 FOOT ACROSS, 15 IN ALL, TOGETHER WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALLER CRATERS, WERE SEEN IN THE CAMP AREA. TWO HOLES WERE ALSO SEEN SOME 20 INCHES ACROSS AND AT LEAST 10 FEET DEEP - PRESUMABLY ENTRY HOLES OF UNEXPLODED BOMBS. ONE OF THESE EXPLODED AT 150430Z AUGUST.

2. NO DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. THE NEAREST IS ABOUT 100 METRES FROM THE CAMP. THE MOSQUE SUFFERED ONLY SPLINTER DAMAGE AND IT SEEMED AS IF THIS BUILDING HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY AVOIDED.

3. FEDAYEEN OCCUPIED BUILDINGS (A VEHICLE WORKSHOP) WERE WITHIN 400 YARDS AND AN IRAQI OCCUPIED AREA SOME 3000 METRES EAST OF THE CAMP.

/4. IN DA'S

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4. IN DA'S OPINION THIS WAS A MOST ACCURATELY EXECUTED ATTACK AGAINST AN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY TARGET. DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE OF NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. LARGE NUMBERS OF PRESS AND TV PERSONNEL ARRIVED AT THE CAMP AT ABOUT 151100Z.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE, JIS(NE) AND D14

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 411

16 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 411 DATED 16 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT BAGHDAD JIS(NE) AND D14 AND REPEATED SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

M.T.I.P.T.

BREACHES OF JORDAN ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE.

I DO NOT OF COURSE KNOW WHAT ISRAELS INTENTIONS ARE, BUT ON THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A CEASE-FIRE ON THE JORDANIAN FRONT THEY PRESUMABLY CALCULATE THAT BY RETALIATING AGAINST JORDANIAN REGULAR FORCES FOR FEDAYEEN RAIDS THEY WILL ENCOURAGE THE FORMER TO PREVENT THE LATTER.

I BELIEVE THAT ON THE CONTRARY THEY WILL IN THE EXISTING DELICATE BALANCE OF STRENGTH MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARMY TO EXERT THE LIMITED AND NECESSARILY UNOBTRUSIVE CONTROL WHICH IS WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY AND WHICH IS THE AIM OF THEIR LATEST REDISPOSITIONS, NAMELY TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN FROM FIRING FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY, RATHER THAN FROM RAIDING ACROSS THE BORDER. IF SIMILAR HEAVY ATTACKS FAIRLY DEEP INTO JORDANIAN TERRITORY CONTINUE THE ISRAELIS RATHER THAN THE FEDAYEEN WILL BECOME THE TARGETS OF MILITARY AND POPULAR RESENTMENT WITH CONSEQUENT ADDED DIFFICULTIES FOR KING HUSSEIN.

2. ALTERNATIVELY SUCH ATTACKS COULD HAVE THE OTHER EFFECT BUT WITH MORE FAR-REACHING AND DANGEROUS CONSEQUENTS THAN THE ISRAELIS PRESUMABLY INTEND. CERTAIN OF KING HUSSEIN'S ADVISERS, WHOSE VOICES WILL HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE RETURN OF SHERIF NASIR, WILL PRESS EVEN MORE STRONGLY FOR GENERALLY "CLOBBERING" THE FEDAYEEN IN THEIR STRONGHOLDS IN AND ABOUT AMMAN AS OPPOSED TO TRYING MERELY TO LIMIT THEIR ACTIVITIES ALONG THE FRONTIER. THEY WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS ANYWAY, AND COULD NOW IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELIS ATTACKS ARGUE THAT BY NOT DOING SO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT ARE GETTING THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS. SUCH ACTION WOULD UNITE THE

/FEDAYEEN

For V.B.

T.A. 1-5  
PK

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FEDAYEEN AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE IN DISARRAY AND WHILE A REPETITION OF THE BLOODSHED AND CHAOS WHICH PREVAILED IN THE JUNE WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE DOUBTFUL. AND IF HUSSEIN'S BID TO REIMPOSE HIS AUTHORITY BY FORCE WAS TO FAIL, THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE WORSE THAN EVER.

3. IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONFINE THEIR REPRISALS (UNDERSTANDABLE ENOUGH IN THEMSELVES) TO THE MOSAIC SCALE OF AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH, AND DIRECT THEM AT THE OFFENDING FEDAYEEN RATHER THAN AT THE GOVERNMENT, WHO HAVE SAID THEY ARE NOT THEIR PALESTINIAN BROTHERS KEEPERS, OR EVEN AT THE IRAQIS IN THE AREA, THE FORCES OF MODERATION IN JORDAN AND THUS ALSO WHAT ONE HOPES IS THE ISRAELI CAUSE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED.  
CAN THEY, EITHER IN TEL AVIV OR IN WASHINGTON, BE MADE TO SEE THIS BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE?

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE JIS(NE) AND D14

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK, AND SAVING TO MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. PHILLIPS

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